In the coming months, Venezuela could experience significant political unrest and violence that lead to the further curtailment of democracy in the country. Presidential elections are scheduled to take place on October 7, 2012. President Hugo Chavez is in the midst of a tough reelection campaign against Henrique Capriles Radonski—the young and energetic governor of the state of Miranda––who enjoys multiparty support and appears to have a better chance of defeating the incumbent than earlier challengers.
Over the course of the past year, Chavez and several of his most senior associates have asserted that there will be instability and violence if he is not reelected. At the same time, Chavez is battling cancer, but he has shared little information with the public about the state of his health beyond the fact that he has twice been treated for the disease since spring 2011. Speculation about Chavez’s health problems has generated considerable uncertainty among his supporters, especially since he has not anointed a successor. Should Chavez appear to be losing the election, die suddenly, or withdraw from public life for health reasons, tensions are likely to rise in Venezuela, especially if the public suspects that Chavez has used extra-constitutional means to preclude or invalidate an opposition victory in order to sustain his regime’s hold on power. Protests over such actions, which could turn violent, may in turn lead to the imposition of martial law and the further curtailment of democratic rights in Venezuela. This would almost certainly trigger a major political crisis in the Western Hemisphere that pits countries seeking to restore democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela—including the United States—against those who support Chavez and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. Longstanding U.S. efforts to promote good governance in Latin America as well as cooperation on a range of political, economic, and security challenges in the region would be threatened as a consequence.
Accordingly, the United States should seek free and fair elections in Venezuela. If Chavez or a replacement candidate is defeated, it should offer to help promote an orderly, peaceful transition. If Chavez is reelected in a process judged acceptably free and fair, the United States should seek to reset the bilateral relationship with an eye toward the eventual renewal of high-level communication on areas of mutual interest. If the election results appear fraudulent or apparently legitimate results are nullified, the United States should encourage international pressure to restore democracy and suspend bilateral business as usual until a legitimate government is restored.
The Daily Beast: "The Last Chance for Hugo Chavez in Venezuela:" Provides a litany of baseless anecdotes to depict President Chavez as a declining, unpopular, crass alternative to the refined proxy-candidate, Radonski. Newsweek ensures that readers are aware that Radonski is of Jewish descent and that relatives of his perished in Nazi concentration camps to add for him a layer of political immunity before Western audiences. Newsweek also implies that a victory for President Chavez would depend on "the old magician" to prevail with a trick.
Daily Globe and Mail: "Decision time for Chavez the democrat:" Implies that President Chavez' loss is inevitable and that he must prove his dedication to "democracy" by gracefully bowing out. Other headlines include, "Have Venezuelans tired of the Chavez revolution?," "Fears abound ahead of close Venezuelan elections," "Election system in Venezuela: High tech, but low trust," and many more, all echoing talking points laid out long ago by the CFR, the Heritage Foundation, and other corporate-financier funded policy think tanks with a direct stake in installing Radonski as head of their planned client-state.
To defend democracy in Venezuela while advancing U.S. interests and values, the Obama Administration should:
Support Venezuelan civil society. Despite restrictive Venezuelan laws, the U.S. should increase its democracy assistance to civil society and NGOs by working to train domestic electoral observers, urge voter participation, coordinate collection and tabulation of voting results, and encouraging all polling stations to report electoral infractions to the CNE and the MUD.
Conduct systematic public diplomacy. The Administration should prepare a public diplomacy brief examining the erosion of democracy and the unfair advantages accumulated by Chávez. It should report the fact that electoral conditions are far from fair.
Reaffirm principles of democracy. President Obama and Secretary Clinton should speak out on democratic principles and the commitment to full democracy, not merely holding elections, in the Americas, highlighting what is at stake in Venezuela, urging citizen participation and transparency, and holding Chávez accountable for the preservation of peace.
Dispatch U.S. observers. The U.S. embassy in Caracas should send its staff in a systematic fashion to monitor the elections on October 7, and Washington should assign additional State Department officers to temporary duty in Caracas.
Call for bipartisan monitoring. The Administration should call on the State Department to assemble a high-level working group of analysts, congressional staff, academics, and electoral experts to monitor and evaluate the election and its outcome.
Heed early warning signs of violence and instability. The Administration should closely monitor the situation in Venezuela on October 7 for evidence of incitement to violence by political parties, harassment of or harm to opposition figures, reprisals against voters, distribution of arms to militias, and increases in politically-related violence.
Establish a coalition for Venezuelan democracy. The U.S. should employ active diplomacy to establish a coalition of democratic leaders—one that could certainly include Canada, Costa Rica, Panama, Chile, Spain, the United Kingdom, and others—to act in unison in case of fraud or violence.
Continue support for democracy. Although the defeat of Capriles would clearly demoralize many Venezuelans, the U.S. must nonetheless continue to offer sustained support for civil society, a free press, free labor unions, and other voices for liberty and preserve the resilience of a unified opposition for future elections.
Appoint a high-level Cuba/Venezuela Mission Director. The position of Cuba/Venezuela Mission Director in the Office of the National Intelligence Director should be filled with a senior-level official with responsibility for all ALBA countries.
Develop an aggressive, proactive plan of action. October 8 will mark the starting point for one of two courses: either one of sustained cooperation and support for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela or one of tough, proactive responses to Chávez’s promised radicalization. Potential policy tools for leverage include visa denials, further Treasury designations of corrupt Venezuelan officials, financial and trade sanctions, interdiction of Venezuelan vessels and aircraft used to transport drugs, the designation of Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism, and an embargo on the purchase of Venezuelan oil. All of these tools should be considered in the event of electoral fraud, significant electoral violence, or hostile acts contrary to U.S. security interests.